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Quantum key distribution (QKD) can be used to generate secret keys between two distant parties.
Even though QKD has been proven unconditionally secure against eavesdroppers with unlimited
computation power, practical implementations of QKD may contain loopholes that may lead to
the generated secret keys being compromised. In this paper, we propose a phase-remapping attack
targeting two practical bidirectional QKD systems (the “plug & play” system and the Sagnac
system). We showed that if the users of the systems are unaware of our attack, the final key shared
between them can be compromised in some situations. Specifically, we showed that, in the case of
the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol with ideal single-photon sources, when the quantum bit
error rate (QBER) is between 14.6% and 20%, our attack renders the final key insecure, whereas
the same range of QBER values has been proved secure if the two users are unaware of our attack;
also, we demonstrated three situations with realistic devices where positive key rates are obtained
without the consideration of Trojan horse attacks but in fact no key can be distilled. We remark
that our attack is feasible with only current technology. Therefore, it is very important to be aware
of our attack in order to ensure absolute security. In finding our attack, we minimize the QBER
over individual measurements described by a general POVM, which has some similarity with the
standard quantum state discrimination problem.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
One important practical application of quantum in-
formation is quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2, 3],
which generates secret keys between two distant parties,
commonly known as Alice and Bob. The advantage of
QKD is that it has been proven unconditionally secure
even when an eavesdropper, Eve, has unlimited compu-
tation power allowed by the law of quantum mechanics
[4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. On the other hand, security proofs
are only as good as their assumptions that real-life QKD
systems may not accomplish due to imperfections. This
may open up new attacks for Eve. Moreover, given a
combination of imperfections, Eve may try to mix and
pick the best (perhaps a combined) eavesdropping strat-
egy to maximize her chance of breaking a QKD system.
It is thus important to construct a catalog of known at-
tacks against practical QKD systems. Moreover, it is
imperative to study specific defenses against proposed
attacks. Notice that implementations of defenses may
open up new security loopholes. It is not enough to say
that defense strategies exist in principle. One must also
battle-test them thoroughly in experiments to see if they
are of any good in practice. We remark that the construc-
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tion of generally agreed theory of eavesdropping attacks
and defenses in realistic “plug-and-play” systems is, in
fact, a five-year goal in the US funding agency ARDA’s
quantum cryptography roadmap [10].
Practical difficulties associated with phase and polar-
ization instabilities over long-distance fiber have led to
the development of two bidirectional QKD structures:the
“plug & play” auto-compensating QKD structure [11]
and the Sagnac QKD structure [12, 13]. In both cases,
one of the legitimate users, Bob, sends strong laser pulses
to the other user, Alice. Alice encodes her information
on the phase of the strong pulse, attenuates it to single
photon level, and then sends it back to Bob. Because
Alice allows signals to go in and go out of her device,
this opens a potential backdoor for Eve to launch various
Trojan horse attacks, which are any attacks that involve
more than just passive attacks. Trojan horse attacks per-
formed by sending probe signals into Alice’s and Bob’s
equipments have been analyzed in [14]; Trojan horse at-
tacks exploiting the detector efficiency mismatch have
been analyzed in [15] and also by us [16]. In this paper,
we propose a specific type of Trojan horse attack, which
we call the phase-remapping attack aiming at bidirec-
tional QKD system using phase coding. We show that,
when Alice and Bob are unaware of our attack, the final
key shared between them can be compromised in some
situations. Also, our attack is feasible with only current
technology. Therefore, it is very important for Alice and
Bob to be aware of our attack when using the “plug &
play” QKD systems or the Sagnac QKD systems and to
correctly identify which situations are secure and which
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FIG. 1: Schematic diagram of the Sagnac QKD system em-
ploying AOM-based phase modulator: LD - pulsed laser
diode; Cir - circulator; C - 2x2 coupler; SPD1, SPD2 - Single
Photon detector
are not.
In the following, we first describe in Sec. II and Sec. III
how phase remapping is performed in the two QKD sys-
tems implementing the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84)
protocol [1], and then we illustrate situations in which the
final keys can be compromised, both in the perfect-single-
photon-source case and in the weak-coherent-state-source
case. For the perfect-single-photon-source case (Sec. IV),
we aim to find the smallest quantum bit error rate
(QBER) under the phase-remapping attack and show
that it is lower than the known QBER threshold under
which secret keys can be distilled when Trojan horse at-
tacks are not taken into account. We formulate our prob-
lem as minimizing the QBER over an individual mea-
surement described by a general POVM. For the weak-
coherent-state-source case (Sec. V), we demonstrates
three specific eavesdropping strategies with the phase-
remapping attack (two of them are also combined with
the fake signals attack [15] which exploits detection effi-
ciency mismatch between two detectors) that lead Alice
and Bob to wrongly believe that they can distill secret
keys at positive rates but in fact no secret key can be
generated. We finally conclude in Sec. VI.
II. PHASE-REMAPPING ATTACK IN SAGNAC
QKD SYSTEMS
The basic structure of the Sagnac QKD system [13]
is shown in Fig.1. Here, to simplify our discussion, we
neglect Bob’s phase modulator. Note that we use an
acoustic-optic modulator (AOM) as a phase modulator
on Alice’s side. The input laser pulse is split by the fiber
coupler into S1 and S2, which go through the fiber loop
clockwise and counterclockwise, respectively. Note that
the AOM is placed in the fiber loop asymmetrically, with
fiber lengths L1 and L2 on the two sides. For the first
order diffracted light, the AOM introduces a frequency
shift equal to its driving frequency (due to Doppler ef-
fect). The phase of the diffracted light is also shifted by
an amount which is equal to the phase of the acoustic
BB84 states new states
FIG. 2: The phase difference between the four states sent by
Alice is changed by Eve to δ. In standard BB84, δ = pi/2.
(Note that the states are drawn so that orthogonal states
are pi/2 apart in the diagram but are pi apart in the actual
phases.)
wave at the time of diffraction [17]. S2 and S1 arrive
at the AOM at different times with the time difference
t2 − t1 = n(L2 − L1)/C = n∆L/C. Here, n is refractive
index of optical fiber and C is the speed of light in vac-
uum. The phase difference between S1 and S2 after they
go through the fiber loop is
∆φ = φ(t2)− φ(t1) = 2pif(t2 − t1) = 2pin∆Lf/C. (1)
By modulating the AOM’s driving frequency f , the rel-
ative phase between S1 and S2 can be modulated. This
is the basic mechanism of our AOM-based phase modu-
lator.
In standard BB84, Alice can encode phase information
{0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2} by modulating the AOM with frequency
{f0, f0+∆f, f0+2∆f, f0+3∆f}. From Eq. (1), the phase
difference depends on both the AOM frequency f and the
fiber length difference ∆L. So, in principle, Eve can build
a device similar to Bob’s one except with different fiber
length and launch an “intercept-and-resend” attack.
Suppose Eve uses her device to send laser pulses to
Alice. Unaware that the pulses come from Eve, Alice
shifts the light frequency by one of the values {f0, f0 +
∆f, f0 + 2∆f, f0 + 3∆f}. By choosing a suitable fiber
length difference L2 − L1, Eve can re-map the encoded
phase information from {0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2} to {0, δ, 2δ, 3δ},
where δ is under Eve’s control. This is illustrated in
Fig. 2.
III. PHASE-REMAPPING ATTACK IN “PLUG
& PLAY” SYSTEMS
In a “plug & play” QKD system [11], the information
is encoded on the relative phase between a signal pulse
and a reference pulse. The phase modulator inside Alice
is supposed to be activated in such a way that only the
signal pulse is modulated while the reference pulse is not.
Unfortunately, in current QKD systems, Alice does not
monitor the arrival times of the two pulses. Instead, she
just uses one of them as the trigger signal to determine
when she should activate her phase modulator. In this
case, Eve can time-shift the signal pulse so that it will
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FIG. 3: The dashed line is the original signal pulse intended to
be modulated at the middle of the phase modulator’s response
to have a phase of pi/2. Eve time shifts the pulse to the one in
solid line. This pulse now arrives at the middle of the rising
edge and acquires a phase of pi/4 instead.
arrive at the phase modulator on its rising or falling edge
and thus will be partially modulated (see Fig. 3). (The
LiNbO3 waveguide-based phase modulators used in cur-
rent QKD systems have rise times ranging from 100ps to
1ns). Therefore, the relative phase between the signal
pulse and reference pulse will be smaller than what it is
supposed to be. In principle, by carefully controlling the
amount of time shift, Eve can re-map the encoded phase
information from {0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2} to {0, δ, 2δ, 3δ}, where
δ ∈ [0, pi/2].
IV. UPPER BOUND ON QBER OF
PHASE-REMAPPING ATTACK WITH A
PERFECT SINGLE-PHOTON SOURCE
We have described the possibility of Eve changing the
phase difference δ between the states sent by Alice in
two practical QKD systems. The important question is:
is this ability of Eve harmful to Alice and Bob in any
way? As we show in this section, Eve can use this ability
to compromise the final key shared between Alice and
Bob under some situations in the perfect-single-photon-
source case. We show this by considering Eve launching
a specific intercept-and-resend attack that is optimized
for the phase difference δ that she has chosen for Alice’s
states. Note that any intercept-and-resend attack com-
pletely breaks the security of any QKD protocol, meaning
that Alice and Bob cannot establish a secret key of any
length [18]. Thus, we want to show that our intercept-
and-resend attack leads to situations that Alice and Bob
(wrongly) believe that they can generate a secret key.
The quantum bit error rate (QBER) is often used as a
measure to judge whether a secret key can be generated
in a QKD experiment. The QBER can be obtained by
Alice and Bob in a QKD experiment by publicly testing
the error rates in a random subset of the transmitted bits.
They use the QBER to determine the amount of eaves-
dropping on the channel and whether to proceed with the
key generation process. Therefore, we want to show that
our intercept-and-resend attack causes a quantum bit er-
ror rate (QBER) that is lower than what is tolerable
without any Trojan horse attacks. In this case, there is a
range of QBER’s that is secure without any Trojan horse
attacks but is now insecure with our Trojan horse attack.
If Alice and Bob are unaware of our Trojan horse attack
and treat these situations as secure, then their final secret
key is compromised and Eve has some information on it.
In the following, we first consider an intercept-and-resend
attack preceded by the phase-remapping operation. In
this attack, Eve’s measurement is optimized and the re-
sent states are the BB84 states. We then consider three
extensions to the attack strategy by optimizing over the
resent states and/or combining the phase remapping at-
tack with the fake signals attack [15]. In all cases, we
show that the final key can be compromised if no Trojan
horse attack is considered.
A. A simple intercept-and-resend attack with
phase remapping
We consider the BB84 protocol with a perfect single-
photon source and detectors. Note that any QBER lower
than 20% is tolerable in BB84 without any Trojan horse
attacks [19, 20, 21], meaning that a secret key can be
distilled. Thus, we aim to construct an intercept-and-
resend attack that produces a QBER lower than this.
The intercept-and-resend attack we consider here is sim-
ilar to the one considered earlier by us [22]. Here, we
optimize the attack to the phase difference between Al-
ice’s states, δ, which is set by Eve.
The four states sent by Alice have phases 0, δ, 2δ, and
3δ, where the phase offset is set to be zero for simplicity
and without loss of generality. We assume that Eve uses
the same detection scheme as Bob does. Thus, for a
state with phase θ, Eve detects the bit values “0” and
“1” with probabilities cos2( θ
2
) and sin2( θ
2
), respectively.
To facilitate the analysis, we denote Alice’s four states as
|ϕ˜k〉 = cos
(
kδ
2
)
|0z〉+ sin
(
kδ
2
)
|1z〉 (2)
where k = 0, . . . , 3 are the indices for the four states, and
|jz〉 , j = 0, 1 are the eigenstates of the Z component of
the Pauli matrix representing the bit values “j”. Simi-
larly, |jx〉 = (|0z〉+(−1)j |1z〉)/
√
2, j = 0, 1 are the eigen-
states of theX component of the Pauli matrix. Here, |ϕ˜0〉
and |ϕ˜2〉 are “0” and “1” in one basis, whereas |ϕ˜1〉 and
|ϕ˜3〉 are “0” and “1” in the other basis. Note that the
normal BB84 states have the phase difference δ = pi/2;
we denote the BB84 states as |ϕk〉.
We consider the following intercept-and-resend attack
by Eve: Eve captures the state sent by Alice, |ϕ˜k〉, and
perform a POVM measurement on it. The POVM con-
sists of five elements, {Mvac,Mi : i = 0, . . . , 3}, with
Mvac +
∑3
i=0Mi = I. For the outcome corresponding
to Mvac, Eve sends a vacuum state to Bob, whereas, for
outcome i, she sends the BB84 state |ϕi〉 to Bob.
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FIG. 4: QBER upper bound of Trojan horse attacks for BB84.
The top two curves correspond to the phase-remapping attack
only whereas the bottom two cures correspond to the combi-
nation of the phase-remapping attack and the fake signals
attack of Ref. [15] (with efficiency mismatch of 0.08). The
QBER of the two solid curves are obtained by minimizing
over the POVM measurement by Eve for each phase differ-
ence δ and assuming a fixed state sent to Bob. The QBER
of the two dashed curves are obtained by minimizing over the
POVM measurement by Eve and the state sent to Bob for
each phase difference δ. Note that the QBER values approach
some minimum values (15.5%, 14.6%, 10.1%, and 5.79%) as
the phase difference between the states approaches zero.
For a fixed phase difference δ, we want to favor Eve
by minimizing the QBER caused by this attack over
the POVM elements. This QBER minimization prob-
lem is similar to the quantum state discrimination prob-
lem [23], where a given state is to be identified among
a set of known states. In our case, since the four
states are not linearly independent, unambiguous dis-
crimination (meaning error free) is not possible [24].
In the standard ambiguous state discrimination prob-
lem, the total probability of incorrectly identifying the
state
∑
i6=j Tr(Mi |ϕ˜j〉 〈ϕ˜j |)/4 is minimized subject to∑3
i=0Mi = I, where the division by four is due to Al-
ice sending one of the four states with equal probabili-
ties. On the other hand, in our problem, the quantity to
minimize is the QBER, which is the error rate on Bob’s
measured signals, not Eve’s error probability. We find the
QBER as follows. Consider M0 first. When M0 occurs,
Eve sends |ϕ0〉 to Bob. If Alice actually sent |ϕ˜0〉, then
there is no error. However, if Alice actually sent |ϕ˜2〉 and
Bob uses the measurement basis {|ϕ0〉 , |ϕ2〉} (only the
cases that Alice and Bob use the same basis are consid-
ered), then Bob always gets an error and thus the QBER
is 1; on the other hand, if Alice actually sent |ϕ˜1〉 or
|ϕ˜3〉 and Bob uses the measurement basis {|ϕ1〉 , |ϕ3〉},
then the QBER is only 1/2. Therefore, the (unnor-
malized) QBER for the M0 case is [
1
2
Tr(M0 |ϕ˜1〉 〈ϕ˜1|) +
Tr(M0 |ϕ˜2〉 〈ϕ˜2|)+ 12Tr(M0 |ϕ˜3〉 〈ϕ˜3|)]/4. Comparing this
with the total error probability of the state discrimina-
tion problem, we see that here different penalties are
incurred for different incorrectly identified states. To
form the final QBER, we need to add the (unnormal-
ized) QBER for the other Mi’s and normalize the sum
with the probability of Eve causing clicks on Bob’s de-
tectors, giving us
QBER =
∑3
i=0Tr(MiLi)∑3
i=0Tr(MiBi)
, (3)
where
Li =
1
2
|ϕ˜1+i〉 〈ϕ˜1+i|+ |ϕ˜2+i〉 〈ϕ˜2+i|
+
1
2
|ϕ˜3+i〉 〈ϕ˜3+i| , (4)
Bi =
3∑
k=0
|ϕ˜k〉 〈ϕ˜k| . (5)
We minimize the QBER over positiveMi’s (see Appendix
for detail). Note that it is not necessary to impose the
constraint
∑3
i=0Mi ≤ I, since any solution to this uncon-
strained problem can always be scaled down sufficiently
to satisfy this constraint. Also note that normalization
of the QBER is necessary since we allow Eve to get an
inconclusive result and send a vacuum state to Bob (i.e.,
we allow Mvac to be non-zero). This is in contrast to the
standard ambiguous state discrimination problem where
all results have to be conclusive.
In general, Eve’s action is a solution to some optimiza-
tion problem, minimizing some general penalty function.
The QBER and the total error probability in the stan-
dard state discrimination problem are two special cases
of such general penalty functions. In our Trojan horse
attack problem, we use the QBER as the objective func-
tion since Alice and Bob can determine this value exper-
imentally and use this value to estimate the amount of
eavesdropping on the quantum channel.
Figure 4 plots the smallest QBER induced by this at-
tack against the phase difference δ (top curve). This
curve is achieved by Eve resending only the states |0z〉
and/or |1x〉 to Bob. Due to the symmetry in their phase-
remapped states |ϕ˜0〉 and |ϕ˜3〉, the resultant QBER’s
are equal (see Fig. 5). Also, it turns out that the QBER
caused by resending the states |1z〉 or |0x〉 is higher than
this curve in the range of δ shown in the figure. We
observe that this QBER curve approaches 15.5% as the
phase difference δ approaches zero. Note that there is
a discontinuity at δ = 0. When the phase difference is
exactly zero, all four states sent by Alice are exactly the
same. Thus, Eve cannot learn anything about Alice’s
bits. In this case, Eve can either send random states to
Bob (in which case the QBER is 1
2
) or send only vacuum
states to Bob (in which case the QBER is undefined since
Bob did not have any click). The source of this discon-
tinuity is that we allow Eve to get an inconclusive result
and send a vacuum state to Bob (i.e., Mvac 6= 0). Note
that in practice, one may restrict Eve’s strategies by re-
quiring a certain minimum detection probability at Bob’s
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FIG. 5: A suboptimal strategy for Eve. She chooses M0 =
|Ψ〉 〈Ψ| where |Ψ〉 is a state orthogonal to |ϕ˜2〉. This strategy
causes a QBER of 16.7%.
side, meaning that Eve has to resend some states to Bob
with a minimum probability. As a consequence, Eve may
launch our attack only at phase differences δ larger than
some small finite value, in which case, the discontinuity
at δ = 0 is irrelevant. In the standard state discrimina-
tion problem, no inconclusive result is allowed and thus
the error probability approaches 1/2 as δ approaches zero
with no discontinuity.
We can understand the behaviour of the top curve in
Fig. 4 at small δ by considering a suboptimal intercept-
and-resend strategy for Eve. Let’s consider that Eve is
only interested in finding a good M0 and assigns M1 =
M2 = M3 = 0. Since |ϕ˜2〉 causes the largest QBER of 1
(whereas |ϕ˜1〉 and |ϕ˜3〉 cause only 1/2), Eve chooses M0
to be a projection onto a state orthogonal to |ϕ˜2〉 (see
Fig. 5). Thus, the probabilities of M0 occurring when
Alice sent |ϕ˜0〉, |ϕ˜1〉, |ϕ˜2〉, and |ϕ˜3〉 are sin2(2δ′), sin2(δ′),
0, and sin2(δ′), respectively. Here, we denote δ′ = δ/2.
Using sin(x) = x for small x and Eq. (3), the QBER is
(1
2
δ′2+ 1
2
δ′2)/(6δ′2) = 1
6
= 16.7%. Note that this value is
just a little bit greater than the QBER of 15.5% of our
optimal attack strategy plotted in Fig. 4. Also note that
Mvac is equal to |ϕ˜2〉 〈ϕ˜2| with a probability of occurrence
of 1− 3δ′2/2 (it is 3δ′2/2 for M0), thereby introducing a
discontinuity in QBER at δ = 0.
The significance of Fig. 4 is that there is a range of
phase differences δ that causes the QBER to go below
20%, which is shown in Ref. [20, 21] to be a tolerable
QBER in BB84 when Eve does not have the ability to
change the δ. This proves that Eve’s ability to change
the phase difference between Alice’s states is helpful to
Eve in breaking the security of BB84. Specifically, when
Alice and Bob are unaware of our Trojan horse attack,
Eve can learn some information on the final key shared
by Alice and Bob. This can be seen as follows: Suppose
Eve launches this attack and induces a QBER of, say,
15.6%. Since this is lower than 20% which is when the
key distillation technique in Ref. [19] is applicable, Alice
and Bob decide to apply this technique to distill a final
key. On the other hand, the result of Ref. [18] says that
no secret key can be established between Alice and Bob
when Eve launches an intercept-and-resend attack. Thus,
the final key shared by Alice and Bob is not completely
secret and Eve has some information on it.
It is important that the transmittance (which is the
fraction of Alice’s signals received by Bob) in the case
of Eve launching this attack is similar to that when Eve
is not present and the system is in normal operation,
since, otherwise, Bob may be able to notice Eve’s inter-
vention by observing the unusually low transmittance.
Obviously, the quantum channel loss directly affects the
transmittance. In our intercept-and-resend attack, Eve
can avoid her signals experiencing the quantum channel
loss. Specifically, she can perform her measurement at
the output port of Alice, and send her measurement re-
sult classically to her ally located at Bob’s side. Her ally
then resends a signal, based on the measurement result,
to Bob. In this way, no channel loss is experienced by Eve
(assuming that the classical channel is perfect). How-
ever, this does not mean that the transmittance in our
attack is one. This is because, based on the Eve’s mea-
surement result, she occasionally sends a vacuum state
to Bob, thus reducing the transmittance. In a typical
experimental setup [25], the loss in the fiber is about 0.2
dB/km. Thus, with an 100 km-long fiber, the transmit-
tance is about 10−
0.2×100
10 = 0.01. In our intercept-and-
resend attack that minimizes the QBER, it can be shown
that for δ > pi/20, transmittance greater than 0.01 can
be achieved. From Fig. 4, when δ = pi/20, the QBER is
about 15.6%. This means that Eve can induce the same
transmittance as in the normal operation of the system
and still she can learn some information about the final
key shared by Alice and Bob.
We remark that the POVM {Mvac,Mi : i = 0, . . . , 3}
of our intercept-and-resend attack is feasible with current
technology since each POVM element Mi is a projection
onto some state and can be implemented as one direction
of an orthogonal projection. Thus, multiple orthogonal
projections can be arranged to realize the projections of
the POVM element Mi.
B. Attack extensions
We may further improve our attack by allowing Eve
to send arbitrary states to Bob with arbitrary number of
POVM elements. Note that changing the states sent to
Bob only affects the penalty values in the QBER (i.e.,
the three coefficients appearing before the three states in
Eq. (4) are affected). By using a similar analysis as in
Ref. [22], we obtain a QBER of 14.6% in this case, about
1% lower than the case of Eve sending BB84 states to
Bob. The QBER upper bound with this improvement is
shown in Fig. 4 as the second curve from the top.
We may combine our phase-remapping attack with an-
other Trojan horse attack proposed in Ref. [15], a fake
6Time t0 t1 
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FIG. 6: Efficiencies of two detectors. When Eve time shifts
the signals to arrive at Bob at time t0 (t1), the efficiency of
detector SPD0 (SPD1) is higher than that of detector SPD1
(SPD0).
signals attack, to obtain even further improvement on
the QBER upper bound. In the fake signals attack, Eve
takes advantage of the detector efficiency mismatch by
time shifting the signals entering Bob’s detector pack-
age. Essentially, by time shifting the arriving signal from
the normal arrival time, the efficiency of the detector
for detecting “0” becomes different from the efficiency
of the detector for detecting “1” (see Fig. 6). Eve may
make use of this difference in the efficiencies to her advan-
tage. Ref. [15] proposed a specific intercept-and-resend
attack with a fixed measurement (the normal BB84 mea-
surement in the X and Z bases) and fixed resent states
(the normal BB84 states but with the time shifted) and
showed that it is possible to compromise the QKD sys-
tem if Alice and Bob are unaware of this attack. Here, we
combine our phase-remapping attack with the fake sig-
nals attack. Specifically, Eve performs phase remapping
of Alice’s states (which is also achieved by time shifting),
measures Alice’s output signals, and resends to Bob some
signals having the arrival time shifted from the normal ar-
rival time. We may proceed to compute the QBER upper
bound by minimizing the QBER over arbitrary POVM
measurements but with the same resent states as those
proposed in Ref. [15] (e.g., when Eve detects the state
|ϕ˜0〉, she resends the |−〉 state time shifted to a location
where the detector for bit “0” has a higher efficiency).
The QBER is the same as Eq. (3) but with different Li
and Bi for this attack. For example, those corresponding
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FIG. 7: QBER upper bound of Trojan horse attacks for
SARG04. The top two curves correspond to the phase-
remapping attack only whereas the bottom two cures cor-
respond to the combination of the phase-remapping attack
and the fake signals attack of Ref. [15]. The QBER of the
two solid curves are obtained by minimizing over the POVM
measurement by Eve for each phase difference δ and assuming
a fixed state sent to Bob. The QBER of the two dashed curves
are obtained by minimizing over the POVM measurement by
Eve and the state sent to Bob for each phase difference δ.
Note that the QBER values approach some minimum values
(23.7%, 22.7%, 11.6%, and 11.3%) as the phase difference be-
tween the states approaches zero.
to sending the |−〉 state are
L0 =
1
2
η1(t0) |ϕ˜0〉 〈ϕ˜0|+ η1(t0) |ϕ˜1〉 〈ϕ˜1|+
1
2
η0(t0) |ϕ˜2〉 〈ϕ˜2| (6)
B0 =
1
2
(η0(t0) + η1(t0))
[ |ϕ˜0〉 〈ϕ˜0|+ |ϕ˜2〉 〈ϕ˜2| ]+
η1(t0)
[ |ϕ˜1〉 〈ϕ˜1|+ |ϕ˜3〉 〈ϕ˜3| ], (7)
where η0(t0) (η1(t0)) is the efficiency of the detector for
bit “0” (“1”) at time t0. This combinational attack re-
sults in the third curve from the top in Fig. 4, with
the assumption that the efficiency mismatch between
the two detectors (i.e., η1(t0)/η0(t0)) is 0.08. Further-
more, by minimizing the QBER over the measurements
and also the states resent by Eve, we obtain the bottom
curve in Fig. 4, with the same efficiency mismatch. As
shown in the figure, there is considerable improvement
in the QBER upper bound by combining with the fake
signals attack. Note that the fake signals attack alone
corresponds to the endpoints of the bottom two curves
at δ = pi/2 (the QBER values are 12.3% and 9.82%).
Moving along the bottom curve, we see that by combin-
ing with our phase-remapping attack, the QBER upper
bound decreases significantly from 9.82% to 5.79%.
Our phase-remapping attack and also the fake sig-
nals attack work against not only on the BB84 protocol,
but also the Scarani-Acin-Ribordy-Gisin 2004 (SARG04)
protocol [26]. We have plotted an analogous figure for the
7SARG04 protocol in Fig. 7. The methods for obtaining
these curves are similar to that for the BB84 protocol.
In this figure, we have also used the efficiency mismatch
of 0.08 for the fake signals attack. We remark that the
tolerable QBER for the SARG04 protocol is 19.9% [22]
when Alice and Bob are not aware of any Trojan horse
attacks. Similar to the conclusion for the BB84 proto-
col, since, as shown in Fig. 7, the QBER values induced
by our phase-remapping attack together with the fake
signals attack for a large range of phase difference δ are
below the tolerable QBER, the security of the SARG04
protocol can be compromised.
V. PHASE-REMAPPING ATTACK WITH A
WEAK COHERENT-STATE SOURCE
In this section, we consider the phase-remapping at-
tack when a weak coherent-state source is used, which
is in contrast to Sec. IV where a single-photon source is
assumed. Here, we aim to show that there exist some sit-
uations where a normal post-processing would lead Alice
and Bob to wrongly believe that the secret key genera-
tion rate is positive but in fact it is zero. In order to
ensure that no secret can be extracted, we again make
Eve perform the time-shifting operation to achieve phase
remapping followed by an intercept-and-resend attack as
in Sec. IV. This time, however, Eve may perform addi-
tional operations before her intercept-and-resend attack.
Since there can be more than one photon in a signal
pulse traveling from Alice to Bob, Eve may perform a
quantum non-demolition (QND) measurement to deter-
mine the number of photons in the signal and then an
intercept-and-resend attack that may dependent on the
photon number. However, in the three strategies that we
will discuss below, Eve does not need to perform such
a QND measurement. Indeed, our three strategies are
feasible with current technology. In any case, any en-
tanglement carried by any signal from Alice to Bob is
destroyed by Eve’s attack, regardless of the number of
photons in the signal, since an intercept-and-resend at-
tack corresponds to an entanglement-breaking channel.
Therefore, the secret key generation rate must be zero
[18].
On Alice and Bob’s side, we adopt a specific post-
processing step after the sifted key is obtained. Specif-
ically, Alice and Bob establish security using the result
of Gottesman-Lo-Lu¨tkenhaus-Preskill (GLLP) [9] (which
assumes the worst-case estimations for the proportion of
the single-photon signals and their QBER) and they op-
tionally perform two-way classical post processing (us-
ing B steps [19]). However, the two-way post-processing
step in Ref. [19] cannot be applied directly, since a single-
photon source is assumed there, whereas we are consid-
ering a weak coherent-state source here. Instead, we
apply the two-way post-processing technique for weak
coherent-state sources proposed by us in Ref. [27] (al-
though decoy states are used there, we will directly apply
the technique without decoy states here). Afterwards,
they perform standard error correction and privacy am-
plification to distill the final key. We summarize a QKD
model for realistic setups, a key generation rate formula
for a weak coherent-state source, and a two-way post-
processing procedure using B steps for a weak coherent-
state source in Appendix B. This background material
will be used later in this section.
Let us construct three specific examples in which Eve
can successfully trick Alice and Bob into believing that
a secret key can be generated. We adopt a model in
which all imperfections are attributed to Eve (as in
Ref. [9, 28, 29]) or, viewed from a different perspec-
tive, Eve can control the quantum channel and the de-
tectors. In both examples, she treats all signals with
two and more photons as single-photon signals and per-
forms an intercept-and-resend attack on all non-vacuum
signals. In the intercept-and-resend attack, we assume
for simplicity that Eve’s measurement only identifies the
states |ϕ˜0〉 and |ϕ˜3〉 and resends some arbitrary states
to Bob [39]. The intercept-and-resend attack is opti-
mized for the phase difference δ that Eve has chosen
to remap Alice’s four states. Note that it is not diffi-
cult to construct intercept-and-resend attacks specific to
signals of certain numbers of photons in a similar way
as that for the single-photon signals. The first example
demonstrates the phase-remapping attack alone with a
weak coherent-state source. The second and third ex-
amples illustrate mixed attack strategies that combine
the phase-remapping attack and the fake signals attack;
and these two examples differ in whether or not Eve fine
tunes her attack strategy to match the overall gain and
the overall QBER (see Appendix B for their definitions)
with the normal operating values.
A. Strategy one
In this strategy, Eve performs phase remapping fol-
lowed by intercepting Alice’s signal and resending only
the states |0z〉 and |1x〉 (with equal probabilities) to Bob
[39]. This strategy produces the following overall gain
and overall QBER, respectively,
Qsignal = pdarke
−µ + (C1 + (1 − C1)pdark)
(1− e−µ) (8)
Esignal =
[
pdarke
−µ/2 + (C1e1 + (1− C1)pdark/2)
(1− e−µ)]/Qsignal, (9)
where pdark is the dark count probability, e1 and C1 are,
respectively, the QBER and the conclusive probability
of the intercept-and-resend attack for the single-photon
case. If there is no detection error (i.e. edetector = 0 and
it is the case in this example), e1 can be computed from
Eqs. (3)-(5) or extracted from the top curve of Fig. 4
for a particular phase difference δ (since the top curve of
Fig. 4 is achieved by Eve resending only the states |0z〉
and/or |1x〉 to Bob). On the other hand, if edetector is
8α [dB/km] ηBob edetector pdark f
0.21 8.0% 0% 10−7 1.16
TABLE I: Simulation parameters. Here, α is the channel
loss coefficient, ηBob is the detector efficiency, edetector is the
detection error probability, pdark is the dark count rate, and f
is the error correction inefficiency. See Appendix B for detail.
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FIG. 8: Key generation rates at various distances. We use
the QKD model parameters shown in Table I to compute the
overall gain and the overall QBER from Eqs. (8)-(9). The
key generation rates are then computed using Eq. (B14) with
three B steps for various distances. Here, the key rates should
be zero (since Eve launches an intercept-and-resend attack)
but are positive in the range 0.12 ≤ δ ≤ 0.75, meaning that
the keys generated in this range are insecure.
not zero, we need to incorporate it in the calculation of
e1, which can be easily done.
Note that both states |0z〉 and |1x〉 sent by Eve to
Bob cause the same QBER’s and the same gains on
Bob’s side (since their phase-remapped states |ϕ˜0〉 and
|ϕ˜3〉 in Eq. (2) are symmetrical (see Fig. 5)). The
conclusive probability C1, which is also the probabil-
ity that Eve resends the states |0z〉 and |1x〉, is equal
to C1 = Tr((M0 + M3)B)/4, where M0 and M3, with
M0 +M3 ≤ I, are the POVM elements for resending the
two states obtained by minimizing the QBER e1, and B
as given in Eq. (5) is the density matrix sent by Alice
to Eve. Also, we assume that Eve always sends a strong
pulse to Bob, which is reflected in the exclusion of Bob’s
detector efficiency ηBob in Eqs. (8)-(9), C1, and e1.
Since Alice and Bob use only the result of GLLP to
ensure security, the mean photon number µ they use
may be very small. (In contrast, when the decoy-state
method [28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34] is used to ensure se-
curity, the mean photon number may be high, e.g. on
the order of 1.) Suppose that the mean photon number
is µ = 8× 10−4 and three B steps are used by Alice and
Bob. We use the QKD model parameters shown in Ta-
ble I to compute the overall gain and the overall QBER
from Eqs. (8)-(9). We can then compute the key gen-
eration rates using Eq. (B14) for various distances, as
η0(t0)/η1(t0) δ Key rate
0.0667 1.02 8.921 × 10−7 (2.610× 10−7)
0.04 1.31 1.622 × 10−6 (1.457× 10−6)
0.03 1.41 2.038 × 10−6 (1.968× 10−6)
TABLE II: Key generation rates for strategy two, in which
Eve combines the phase-remapping attack with a fake signals
attack. The first column is the efficiency mismatch of the two
detectors (related to the fake signals attack); the second col-
umn is the phase difference between the states sent by Alice
chosen to maximize the key generation rate (related to the
phase-remapping attack); the third column is the key gener-
ation rate for the phase difference in the second column. The
rates in brackets correspond to the case of only the fake sig-
nals attack without the phase-remapping attack. Note that
there is some improvement in the key rates by combining both
attacks. We used a mean photon number of µ = 8× 10−4.
shown in Fig. 8. The important point is that there is a
range of phase differences (0.12 ≤ δ ≤ 0.75) where the
key generation rates are positive, but in fact no key can
be generated since Eve’s intercept-and-resend attack cor-
responds to an entanglement-breaking channel [18]. This
means that the final keys generated in this range are inse-
cure. The key generation rates outside this range is zero
with this particular strategy. In contrast to this strat-
egy, the two strategies that we describe next combine
the phase-remapping attack with the fake signals attack
[15].
B. Strategy two
This strategy combines the phase-remapping attack
with the fake signals attack [15]. Specifically, in this
strategy, Eve performs phase-remapping followed by in-
tercepting Alice’s signals and resending a time-shifted
single-photon signal of arbitrary state to Bob. Note that
one crucial difference between this strategy and strategy
one is that here Eve takes advantage of the efficiency mis-
match of the detectors by time shifting her signals sent
to Bob. To simplify the analysis, we assume that Eve
always sends single-photon signals to Bob (in which case
the ratio of the efficiencies is the largest (cf. Eq. (B3)
and double clicks due to multiple photons of arbitrary
states are avoided). We compute the overall gain and
the overall QBER by using Eq. (8) and Eq. (9) respec-
tively. Here, we also assume that Eve only resends when
she detects |ϕ˜0〉 and |ϕ˜3〉 (as in strategy one); and thus
the resending probability is C1 = Tr(M0B0 +M3B3)/4
where Bi is from Eq. (7). We allow Eve to resend arbi-
trary states to Bob; thus e1 can be extracted from the
bottom curve of Fig. 4 for a particular phase difference
δ (if the efficiency mismatch is 0.08) or computed from
Eqs. (3), (6), (7), and the corresponding equations for L3
and B3.
We assume Alice and Bob use only the result of GLLP
to ensure security and no B step is used. We use the QKD
9model parameters shown in Table I and µ = 8× 10−4 to
compute the overall gain and the overall QBER for this
strategy. We then compute the key generation rates using
Eq. (B14) for a few cases, and the result is tabulated
in Table. II. Here, we assume that when Eve detects
|ϕ˜0〉 (|ϕ˜3〉), she time shifts the signal to arrive at Bob
at time t0 (t1) as in Fig. 6 and we assume symmetry
between the two detectors such that η0(t0) = η1(t1) =
ηBob and η1(t0) = η0(t1), where ηi(t) is the efficiency
of detector i at time t. As shown in the table, the key
generation rates are positive but should be zero since
this strategy is an intercept-and-resend attack strategy
[18]. Therefore, the final key Alice and Bob distill is
compromised by Eve. Note that the key generation rates
of this strategy are higher than that of strategy one. One
drawback of this strategy is that the overall gain and the
overall QBER induced by Eve may be quite different from
what Alice and Bob may expect in a normal situation.
To overcome this, we discuss a third strategy below that
matches the induced gain and QBER with the normal
operating values. Nevertheless, with this example, we
have demonstrated that our phase-remapping attack in
combination with the fake signals attack can compromise
the security of the QKD system if Alice and Bob are
unaware of the attack strategy.
C. Strategy three
In this strategy, Eve also performs a combination of the
phase-remapping attack and the fake signals attack [15]
as in strategy two, but here she adjusts the parameters
of her attack to match the overall gain and the overall
QBER with what Alice and Bob would expect in normal
cases. Alice and Bob may have some idea on the param-
eters of their system and may have certain expectation
on the overall gain and QBER. Thus, Eve needs to ad-
just her attack in order to simulate a normal situation.
She does this by altering the dark count probability of
Bob’s detectors (as stated before, we assume that the
detectors are under Eve’s control) and changing the re-
sending probability in the intercept-and-resend attack.
Other than these two adjustments, strategy three is oth-
erwise the same as strategy two. In this strategy, the
overall gain and overall QBER are, respectively,
Qsignal = Y0e
−µ + (γC1 + (1 − γC1)Y0)(1− e−µ)(10)
Esignal =
[
Y0e
−µ/2 + (γC1e1 + (1− γC1)Y0/2)
(1− e−µ)]/Qsignal, (11)
where Y0 is the dark count probability Eve chooses (which
can be different from the normal dark count probability
pdark) and 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 is the resending probability for
conclusive results. The other variables are the same as
in strategy two.
We assume that the normal situation is produced
by the QKD model parameters shown in Table I and
µ = 8× 10−4. From these parameters, the normal oper-
Distance [km] η0(t0)
η1(t0)
δ Y0 γ Key rate
88.0 0.04 1.31 1× 10−9 0.096 4.057 × 10−8
87.0 0.03 1.41 1.8× 10−8 0.1 5.838 × 10−8
TABLE III: Two situations in which Eve’s attack produces
the same overall gain and overall QBER as that produced in
a normal situation described by the parameters in Table I.
Here, Eve fine tunes her attack by adjusting the phase dif-
ference δ, the dark count probability Y0, and the resending
probability γ for some distance and some efficiency mismatch
between the two detectors. We assume that Alice and Bob
perform the post-processing steps from GLLP and no B step
as described in Appendix B. The fact that the key generation
rates, computed using Eq. (B14), are positive means that Eve
has successfully compromised the final keys. We used a mean
photon number of µ = 8× 10−4.
ating values of the overall QBER and the overall gain can
be computed from Eqs. (B12)-(B13). Eve then chooses
the phase difference δ, the dark count probability Y0, and
the resending probability γ for a fixed efficiency mismatch
to match the overall QBER induced by her (Eq. (8)) and
the overall gain induced by her (Eq. (9)) within 10% of
the normal operating values. We assume that Eve does
not interfere with the detection error probability; thus,
we still have edetector = 0 as in the normal situation and
the QBER of the single-photon signals, e1, is computed
as in strategy two. We show in Table III two instances in
which Eve’s combination of the phase-remapping attack
and the fake signals attack achieves positive key gener-
ation rates. In both instances, Alice and Bob simply
use the post-processing steps from GLLP and no B step
to distill secret keys as described earlier, with the QKD
model parameters shown in Table I and µ = 8 × 10−4.
In this example, both the normal situation and the hos-
tile situation look similar to Alice and Bob. The normal
situation arises when Eve is not present while the hostile
situation arises when Eve launches this attack strategy.
Since both situations give rise to the same overall QBER
and overall gain, Alice and Bob are unaware of which sit-
uation they are in and thus distill keys at the same key
generation rate in both situations. However, no secret
key can be generated in the hostile case, since it corre-
sponds to an entanglement-breaking channel [18]. Thus,
if Alice and Bob are unaware of the Trojan horse attack,
they may generate keys that are compromised by Eve.
Note that the values of the dark count probability Y0
in Table III are lower than the normal value given in
Table I. While lowering the dark count probability may
be difficult to achieve in practice, Eve may realize this
strategy by increasing the dark count probability in the
normal situation instead. In addition, we point out that
dark count probability on the order of 10−9 has been at-
tained experimentally [35]; thus, the values of the dark
count probability Y0 shown in Table III are realistic. We
also note that the discontinuity in Fig. 4 at δ = 0 does
not manifest as a problem in this attack for the weak
coherent-state source. This is because the phase differ-
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ence δ is chosen to match the overall QBER and gain
with some normal operating values. In normal scenarios,
δ is set to some non-zero value.
We remark that although the key generation rates in
the three examples may not be very significant, they do
raise the awareness that the Trojan horse attack we pro-
pose can be detrimental to Alice and Bob.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed a realistic Trojan horse attack, the
phase-remapping attack, for two-way quantum key dis-
tribution systems implementing the BB84 protocol. We
have shown that, when Alice and Bob are unaware of our
attack, there are situations in both the perfect-single-
photon-source case and the weak-coherent-state-source
case that the final key shared between them is com-
promised and Eve has some information on it. Specifi-
cally, for the perfect-single-photon-source case, when the
QBER is larger than 14.6%, Alice and Bob may distill
a compromised key. For the weak-coherent-state-source
case, we have given three examples (two of which are
combined with a fake signals attack) in which the final
keys are insecure. Note that our attack is feasible with
only current technology and thus is highly practical for
Eve to implement. Therefore, it is important for Alice
and Bob to be aware of the possibility of our attack and
to guard against it by only generating a key when the
QBER is low enough.
We remark that the fact that we demonstrated the in-
security of a key guaranteed to be secure by some existing
security proofs does not imply that the proofs are incor-
rect. It is because the Trojan horse attack we demon-
strated corresponds to performing operations and using
information lying outside the Hilbert space assumed in
the proofs. These extra operations and information are
granted to us by the practical implementations of the
BB84 protocol. Thus, while a QKD protocol may be un-
conditionally secure, a realistic implementation of it may
open up security loopholes via extra dimensions.
APPENDIX A: MINIMIZATION OF QBER
The normalized bit error rate is (c.f. Eq. (3))
QBER =
∑3
i=0
∑1
j=0 〈jz |WiLiW †i |jz〉∑3
i=0
∑1
j=0 〈jz |WiBiW †i |jz〉
, (A1)
where Li and Bi are given in Eq. (4) and Eq. (5), re-
spectively, and W †i Wi , Mi are the POVM elements.
We want to minimize QBER over the eight independent
row vectors 〈jz |Wi each with two elements. At least one
of the eight must be non-zero, because otherwise all Wi
would be zero and there would be no qubits sent to Bob.
Since QBER is not a sum of eight independent ratios,
i.e.,
QBER 6=
3∑
i=0
1∑
j=0
〈jz |WiLiW †i |jz〉
〈jz|WiBiW †i |jz〉
, (A2)
it may appear at first sight that the minimization of
QBER is not trivial. However, it turns out that we can
minimize each ratio independently and set QBER to be
the smallest ratio by assigning zeros to the other seven
vectors. We show this by the following claim:
Claim 1 Given two ratios, a1
a2
and b1
b2
, if a1
a2
≤ b1
b2
, then
a1
a2
≤ a1+b1
a2+b2
.
Therefore, we consider separately minimizing each ratio,
which can be written as
〈cji|B−
1
2
i LiB
− 1
2
i |cji〉
〈cji|cji〉 , (A3)
where 〈cji| = 〈jz |WiB
1
2
i is a row vector with two ele-
ments. The eigenvector of B
− 1
2
i LiB
− 1
2
i corresponding to
the minimum eigenvalue minimizes Eq. (A3). The min-
imum eigenvalue among all i’s is the minimum QBER,
which is the top curve plotted in Fig. 4. It is not difficult
to ensure that the POVM elements satisfy
∑3
i=0W
†
i Wi ≤
I. Note that we can always scale the POVM elements (by
the same factor) without affecting the QBER. Thus, it is
always possible to find a scaling such that these POVM
elements and an additional one corresponding to sending
a vacuum state to Bob add up to identity.
APPENDIX B: REVIEW OF QKD MODEL AND
KEY GENERATION RATE FOR REALISTIC
SETUPS
We first review a widely-used model for realistic QKD
setup (see, e.g., [28, 36]). This model is suitable for fiber-
based QKD systems. We then summarize the key gener-
ation rate from GLLP [9] and the B step [19, 27, 37], for
the weak-coherent-state-source case.
Source: The source is a single-mode laser source. We
assume that the phase of each pulse is randomized. Thus,
the laser source emits pulses that are a classical mixtures
of the photon number states with a Poisson distribution:
∞∑
i=0
µ
i!
e−µ |i〉 〈i| , (B1)
where µ is the mean photon number.
Transmission: The quantum channel is the optical
fiber and we quantify the loss in the optical fiber by the
probability that an input photon is lost at the end of the
transmission. Let α in dB/km be the loss coefficient of
the optical fiber and l be the fiber length in km. Then,
the probability that the input photon is not lost is equal
to 10−
αl
10 .
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Detection: We assume Bob is equipped with thresh-
old detectors. Since they are not completely efficient,
there is some chance that they do not produce a click
even when there are some photons present at the inputs.
The probability that Bob’s detector detects the presence
of an input photon is defined as Bob’s detection efficiency
ηBob. Combining the loss in the quantum channel and
the inefficiency of Bob’s detector, we arrive at the over-
all transmission efficiency, η. It is the probability that a
photon is detected given that one has been sent, and is
given by
η = 10−
αl
10 ηBob. (B2)
When the input signal contains more than one photons,
the signal is detected if at least one photon is detected.
Thus, the transmission efficiency for an n-photon signal
is
ηn = 1− (1− η)n. (B3)
When there is no input to Bob’s detector, there is a
possibility that it generates a detection event. This is due
to the intrinsic detector’s dark counts, the background
spray, and the leakage from timing signals. We denote
the probability of this false detection event as pdetector.
Suppose that there are two detectors in the system. We
denote the probability of false detection for the system
as pdark = 2pdetector(1− pdetector).
When there is a double-click event, which occurs be-
cause of dark counts or detection of a multi-photon sig-
nal, we impose that Bob takes one of the bit values ran-
domly [8, 9]. This is consistent with the so-called “squash
operation” used in the security proof of GLLP [9].
More concretely, the security proof of GLLP assumes
that the squash operation is performed by Eve. This op-
eration is a mapping from a multi-photon state to a qubit
state. Thus, under this assumption, Eve always sends
a qubit state to Bob. In this paper, we directly apply
the result of GLLP to our calculations of key generation
rates and therefore we assume the squash operation with-
out proof. We consider two-way classical post-processing
in this paper and our squash-operation assumption sim-
plifies our analysis. We remark that Koashi [38] has
proved the security of one-way classical post-processing
type QKD for a threshold detector model without requir-
ing the squash-operation assumption.
Yield, QBER, gain: Let us define the yield Yn, the
quantum bit error rate (QBER) en, and the gainQn. The
yield, Yn, is defined as the probability that Bob detects
a signal conditional on Alice’s n-photon emission:
Yn , Pr{Detection by Bob|
Alice sent n-photon state}. (B4)
The yield is basically a sum of the probabilities of the
error events and the no-error events. The fraction of the
error events in the total probability is the quantum bit
error rate en:
en , Pr{Bob’s result is incorrect|
detection by Bob ∧
Alice sent n-photon state}. (B5)
The gain of the n-photon state is
Qn , Pr{Detection by Bob ∧
Alice sent n-photon state} (B6)
= Yne
−µµn/n!. (B7)
The overall gain and the overall QBER are the weighted
averages of all the n-photon gains and QBER’s:
Qsignal =
∞∑
n=0
Yne
−µµn/n! (B8)
Esignal =
1
Qsignal
∞∑
n=0
enYne
−µµn/n!. (B9)
These two are parameters that Alice and Bob measure
during a QKD experiment and can be used to determine
the key generation rate [9].
Normal situation: When Eve is not present, we as-
sume that signals are emitted by the weak coherent-state
source at Alice’s side, travel through the optical fiber suf-
fering some loss, and reach Bob on his detectors. Under
this situation, the normal values for the yields and the
QBER for BB84 can be obtained as
Yn = pdark(1− ηn) + ηn (B10)
en =
[
pdark(1− ηn)/2 + ηnedetector
]
/Yn, (B11)
where edetector is a parameter representing the misalign-
ment of the detector setup. For the overall gain and the
overall QBER, their normal values are
Qsignal = pdarke
−µη + 1− e−µη (B12)
Esignal =
1
Qsignal
[pdarke−µη
2
+
(1− e−µη)edetector
]
. (B13)
Key generation rate: Once Alice and Bob have mea-
sured the overall gain and the overall QBER, the key
generation rate may be obtained by using a result in
GLLP [9] as follows:
R =
1
2
rBQsignal
[− f(Esignal)H2(Esignal) +
Ω(1−H2(ep))
]
, (B14)
where f(·) is the error correction efficiency as a function
of the QBER, H2(p) = −p log2(p) − (1 − p) log2(1 − p)
is the binary entropy function, Ω = Q1/Qsignal is the
fraction of single-photon states, ep is the phase error
rate of the single-photon states, and rB is the fraction
of bits retained after B steps (rB = 1 if no B step is
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performed). The factor of 1/2 is the fraction of bits re-
tained after basis reconciliation for BB84. The first term
in the bracket is related to error correction, while the
second term is related to privacy amplification. In this
equation, Q1 and ep are not directly measured, but they
may be bounded by assuming the worst-case situation
[9]. We may pessimistically assume that the overall gain
Qsignal is contributed by multi-photon signals as much
as possible, and all the errors come from single-photon
detection events, leading to Q1 = Qsignal − pmulti and
e1 = EsignalQsignal/Q1, where pmulti is the probability
of Alice emitting multi-photon signals. Before the post-
processing using B steps (which we describe next), the
phase error rate is equal to the bit error rate for the
single-photon states, i.e. ep = e1.
B step: Optionally, Alice and Bob may perform one
or more B steps by using two-way classical communi-
cations to increase the achievable secure distance. The
B step was analyzed in Ref. [19] for the single-photon
source and in Ref. [27, 37] for the weak coherent-state
source. Each B step involves the following operations:
Alice and Bob first randomly pair up their bits, say x1,
x2 on Alice’s side and the corresponding y1, y2 on Bob’s
side. They compute the parities of the pairs, x1⊕x2 and
y1 ⊕ y2, and publicly compare them. If both parities are
the same, they keep x1 and y1 and discard x2 and y2;
otherwise, they discard x1, x2, y1, and y2. After each
B step, the bit and phase error rates and the fraction of
the single-photon states change. We summarize the up-
date formulas for the changes after running one B step
as follows [27]:
Ω′ =
Ω2(e21 + (1 − e1)2)
E2signal + (1− Esignal)2
(B15)
E′signal =
E2signal
E2signal + (1− Esignal)2
(B16)
e′p =
2ep(1− e1 − ep)
e21 + (1− e1)2
(B17)
e′1 =
e12
e21 + (1− e1)2
(B18)
r′B = rB(E
2
signal + (1− Esignal)2)/2, (B19)
where the primed (unprimed) variables are the new (old)
values. After running some number of B steps, we may
obtain the key generation rate by using Eq. (B14).
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